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This paper seeks to advance the horizon of Kwasi Wiredu’s philosophical defense of the 
compatibility of cultural universals and particulars. Wiredu reflects on language, biological 
identity, inter/intra cultural communication, as well as epistemic and moral fundamentals as 
cultural universals. In pursuing further Wiredu’s thesis on cultural universals, the present paper 
critically examines some of the inconsistencies implicit in Wiredu’s position. As a consequence, 
the paper extends the frontiers of the realm of universals by establishing the plausibility of 
causality as another instance of a conceptual universal, transcending all cultural particularities. 
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Introduction 
A prominent issue that has dominated the enterprise of African philosophy since its inception in 
written form is the question of how to define African identity (Owolabi 1999, 22). Most 




















intellectual discussions in African philosophy are reactions to this problem of identity. Two 
things are largely responsible for this search for African identity. One is the negative impact of 
the colonial experience of domination and exploitation in Africa. The second is the ethnocentric 
assertion of Western scholarship to the denigration of anything that is African. At the base of that 
Western intellectual discourse is the Hegelian claim that: 
[Africa] is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to 
exhibit. Historical movements in it—that is in its northern part—belong to the 
Asiatic or European World…. Africa is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still 
involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here 
only as on the threshold of the World’s History (Hegel, 1956, 99). 
 
Hegel is not alone in this epistemic ethnocentrism (Mudimpe 1988); there are also the 
anthropological claims of Durkheim (1912), Frazer (1922), Levy-Bruhl (1949) and Horton 
(1981) to the ethnocentric, racist and imperialist effects that rationality is a prerogative of 
Western civilization, while the Africans are mentally primitive. The significant role of Western 
scholarship and erstwhile Western imperial lords in presenting and treating the African people as 
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inferior and deserving of external control, necessitates that African scholarship in the post 
colonial era, should be active in the deconstruction of this battered identity (Balogun 2007, 1). 
 
In this quest for African self-definition, two orientations are dominant. The first affirms the 
cultural pluralism postulated by Western scholarship, but denies the hierarchy of cultures 
(Owolabi 1999, 24). This first orientation is preoccupied with the discovery of authentic and 
unique African identity by insisting on Africans’ own previously un-respected and neglected 
particularities. Scholars such as Abraham (1966), Mbiti (1969), Sodipo (1975), Anyanwu (1983), 
Tempels (1959) and Senghor (1991) who are in this category have sympathy for the orientation 
in African philosophy which emphasizes the peculiarities of African culture. To these scholars, 
all philosophies are cultural philosophies, and no philosophical datum of any given culture is 
applicable to other cultures. Within this orientation can be categorized the ethnophilosophers, the 
defenders of negritude and other cultural nationalists. 
 
The second reaction to the crisis of self-identity within African scholarship denies cultural 
relativism and ethnocentrism maintained by Western anthropological scholarship. Its contention 
is that though certain aspects of societal cultures are different, human cultures still share certain 
fundamental traits that allow for cross-cultural comparisons and interactions (Owolabi 
1999, 24). Hence, Bodunrin (1985), Hountondji (1983), Appiah (1992), Towa (1991) and 
Wiredu (1980) who are members of this orientation insist on cultural universalism. 
 
From the above dominant orientations in the quest for African self-identity, the general 
impression is that there is a dichotomy and incompatibility between the perspectives of African 
scholars on cultural universalism and particularism. This paper aims to interrogate the issues of 
universalism and particularism in human culture, especially in relation to the African search for 
self- definition. Towards this end, the paper critically examines Kwasi Wiredu’s perspective on 
the discourse. 
 
The following questions shall guide our reflections: 
* What is Wiredu’s perspective on the philosophical problem of cultural universals and 
particulars? 




















* How adequate is Wiredu’s position? 
* Are there cultural universals? 
 
Wiredu on Cultural Universals and Particulars 
Kwasi Wiredu is one of the foremost contemporary African philosophers. A prominent and 
enterprising intellectual, his immense contributions to African philosophy have distinguished 
him among his peers of modern critical philosophizing on the African continent. In his book, 
Cultural Universals and Particulars (1996), Wiredu discusses the apparent paradox of 
universalism and particularism in human culture. In the book, Wiredu argues that it is possible to 
arrive at concepts of universal relevance, which can be disentangled from the contingencies of 
culture. For him, the universal nature of some concepts make them intelligible within different 
cultural groups. In his opinion, there are universals and particulars in philosophy, religion and 
culture. 
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According to Wiredu, universals are ultimately based on human nature, which is common, 
whereas particulars stem from some accidental variations in culture. Universal is what is general, 
and what is general is what can be instantiated (Wiredu 1983, 122). We can speak also of the 
degrees of generality. In this case, that which can be instantiated may itself be an instance of 
something more general. The characteristic of something, be it object or entity, of being an 
instance but incapable of being instantiated is the defining feature of particulars. Wiredu believes 
that there are universals, and by virtue of their being conceptual in nature, they are intelligible 
across cultures. On the basis of the intercultural intelligibility of universal concepts, Wiredu 
(1980, 33) assumes that philosophy can be universal, though it is culture-relative in actuality. 
Through logical application of the inferential rule of reductio ad absurdum, Wiredu attacks the 
concept of particularism and shows that it is a self-refuting notion. His argument is this: 
Suppose there were no cultural universal, then intercultural communication would 
be impossible. But there is intercultural communication. Therefore, there are 
cultural universals (Wiredu 1996, 21). 
 
The above logical proof is connected with Wiredu’s observation of the unprecedented 
intensification of interactions across cultures (reinforced by the advancement in information 
technology) in the contemporary world. Wiredu believes that cross-cultural evaluation is 
achievable. This fact of interpersonal, intra/inter cultural communication, Wiredu tells us, makes 
relativism self-refuting. 
 
Wiredu argues against relativism in its various forms - cognitive, ethical and cultural - and shows 
the possibility and actual existence of universals on conceptual, cognitive and ethical grounds. 
The assumption behind his argument is that the entire human race shares some fundamental 
categories and criteria of thought. This should not be understood as an outright denial of 
particularities and differences among cultures. On the contrary, Wiredu (1996, 22) defends the 
position that there are elements of both particularity and universality in any culture. Accordingly, 
he argues that human behaviour is governed by both instinct and culture. Because of the element 
of instinct, we can be sure of a certain species-distinctive uniformity in human actions and 
reactions. In view of the elements of culture such as those of habit, instruction and conscious 
thought, we have the natural presence of diversity and variation. 
 




















In Wiredu’s view, instinct accounts for the possibility of objectivity and universality in the 
standards of thought and action in our species. On the other hand, culture accounts for various 
degrees of relativity and subjectivity. However, he points out that what unifies us is more 
fundamental than that which differentiates us. This unity, Wiredu tells us, is our biologico-
cultural identity as Homo sapiens: 
This status of being a human person implies that man has more than instinct in the 
drive for equilibrium and self- preservation… [In other words,] being a human 
person implies having the capacity of reflective perception, abstraction, deduction 
and induction. In their basic nature, these mental capacities are the same for all 
humans; irrespective of whether they inhabit Europe, Asia or Africa … (Wiredu 
1996, 23). 
Wiredu’s point is that as Homo sapiens, humans go beyond instincts by complementing it with 
wit in their struggle for social order and self-survival. 
 
Wiredu’s fundamental thesis on the possibility of conceptual universals and particulars is put 
thus: 
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Two assumptions that may safely be made about the human species are, one, that 
the entire race shares some fundamental categories and criteria of thought in 
common and, two that nevertheless, there are some very deep disparities among 
the different tribes of human kind in regard to their modes of conceptualization in 
some sensitive areas of thought (Wiredu 1996, 45).  
 
Conceptual universals refer to the common criterion of thought in our common humanity. Action 
presupposes thought, which involves reflective perception, judgment and inference. Social 
action, which is an essential element of human existence, involves not only thought, but also 
communication, which is present at a very early stage of the development of the thinking powers 
of a human person. Instinct accounts for the possibility of communication among different 
peoples. As for cultural particularities, it accounts for the difficulties and complications that 
frequently beset global interactions. Writing on what counts as our common human identity, 
Wiredu notes: 
The human constitution of flesh and bones, quickened by electrical charges and 
wrapped up in variously pigmented integument, is the same everywhere; while 
there is only one world in which we all live, move, and have our struggles, 
notwithstanding such things as the vagaries of climate. These facts, which 
underlie the possibility of communication among kith and kin, are the same facts 
that underlie the possibility of communication among the various peoples of the 
world (Wiredu 1996, 23).  
 
Wiredu (1996, 60) believes that we can deduce the existence of certain 
universal canons of conceptualization from the biological identity of man . These 
universal canons of conceptualization consist of three norms of thought and conduct, which 
Wiredu identifies as the principles of non-contradiction, induction and the categorical imperative 
(Wiredu 1996, 22). 
 
A preliminary understanding of what Wiredu means by “norms of thought” is important. Just 
like moral norms (rules of conduct), norms of thought are the rules of thought and talk that make 
human community possible. For Wiredu, a hypothetico-syllogistic relationship exists between 
thought, communication and community: 
Without communication, community is impossible, and without thought, 
communication is impossible. But without some common norms of talk, 
communication is impossible and without common norms of thought, common 




















norms of talk are unavoidable. Therefore, without some common norms of 
thought a human community is impossible (Wiredu 1996, 34). 
As Masolo (2005, par 25) explains, Wiredu argues that if the fundamental goal of 
communication is to share meanings or significations, then meanings or significations must be 
objectively accessible to all people who engage in that basic and defining human practice. 
Meanings surpass the finiteness of either their referents or the forms of their culturally specific 
linguistic expressions. They are objective, and so they can be accessed by anyone capable of 
handling communication. 
 
Having stated the imperative of the universal norms of thought, as well as the nexus between 
communication, meaning and objectivity, let us now return to the meanings of the principles 
underlying universal canons of thought identified by Wiredu - the principles of non-
contradiction, induction and the categorical imperative. The law of non-contradiction is a canon 
of inquiry which states that no claim can be both true and false at the same time and place. In the 
absence of this canon individual human survival would be in jeopardy, because one would not be 
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able to differentiate affirmation from denial in communication. Like the principle of non-
contradiction, induction is also an epistemic norm, necessary for interaction in the human world. 
Nevertheless, Wiredu only referred to Hume’s discussion on the relation between cause and 
effect without giving reasons for him (Wiredu) considering induction to be a universal. 
 
Unlike Kant’s categorical imperative which is an ethical principle, Wiredu’s use of the term is in 
the sense of a norm of thought. In this sense, categorical imperative is a peremptory norm that 
overrides contrary disciplinary inclinations and tendencies in the domains of thought (Wiredu 
1996, 38). Wiredu builds on what is well known to be particularly underdeveloped in Kant's 
enterprise. Kant's categorical imperative inadequately accounts for the transfer to others of 
independently attained moral principles. Wiredu closes that gap by suggesting that the unity 
between the individual and the universal does not reside in the abstract. Rather, it is in the 
biological unity (relational inter-dependence) of the species (Masolo 2005, 36). 
 
The universality of the three norms of thought enables members of the human species not only to 
be adaptable to different language variations, but also to translate between them concepts, which 
like the rules of thought by which they are produced, are universal. 
 
Given the universality of conceptual understanding, Wiredu makes a case for epistemic 
universals. Contrary to relativistic fancy, he argues for the possibility of cognitive criteria for the 
cross-cultural evaluation of the truth and rationality of belief systems. Bearing in mind the 
inconsistency that would be involved in granting the possibility of conceptual universals and 
denying its cognitive variety, Wiredu establishes a link between conceptual and epistemic 
universals. His argument is that the power of conceptualization, which is one of the factors of 
communication, involves the capacity to react to stimuli in the external world in a law-like 
manner. Such capacity involves a basic sensitivity to the principle of non-contradiction and the 
ability to contemplate empirical hypothetical scenarios. This implies the capacity to learn from 
experience through the principle of induction. If the principles of non-contradiction and 
induction that are basic to human knowledge are implicit in the power of conceptualization, then, 
Wiredu concludes, “it is apparent that together they unite the human activities of understanding 




















and knowing in such a way as to make it impossible that different peoples might be able to 
communicate but unable to argue rationally among themselves” (Wiredu 1996, 24). 
 
Furthermore, Wiredu explores the possibility of establishing moral universalism - to find out a 
principle of conduct such that without its recognition, the survival of human society in a tolerable 
condition would be inconceivable. In doing this, he distinguishes between custom and morality. 
In his view, customs are contingent facts of particular social formations and broadly constitute 
such things as usages, traditions, conventions, etiquette, fashions, aesthetic standards, taboos, 
rituals, folklore etc. All these are rules of thought and action and to say that the basis for 
evaluating them is contingent is to say that there are no universally valid principles to that 
purpose (Wiredu 1996, 28). In other words, the rightness or wrongness of these rules is culture 
relative. However, morality is never particularistic like custom. Rather, it is a cultural universal. 
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Wiredu defines morality in the strict sense as the motivated pursuit of sympathetic impartiality. 
This definition naturally suggests the imperative “let your conduct at all times manifest a due 
concern for the interest of others”. A person is said to show due concern for the interests of 
others “if in contemplating the impact of his/her actions on their interests, the person puts 
him/herself imaginatively in their position, and having done so, is able to welcome that impact” 
(Wiredu 1996, 30). Sympathetic impartiality represents a fusion of impartiality and sympathy: 
the impartiality is what the moral rules embody, and the sympathy is what the moral motivation 
evinces (Wiredu 1996, 31). This principle of sympathetic impartiality is, according to him, a 
human universal transcending cultures viewed as social forms and customary beliefs and 
practices. In being common to all human practice of morality, it is a universal of any non-brutish 
form of human life (Wiredu 1996, 31). Wiredu’s point is that sympathetic impartiality is a moral 
principle of universal appeal, because there is no society where everyone will gloriously avow 
and act contrary to this principle without experiencing a brutish and poor life. Thus such values 
as truthfulness, honesty, justice, chastity, etc. are aspects of sympathetic impartiality, and do not 
differentiate morality from culture to culture. The contingencies of cultures may only introduce 
some variations of details in the definitions of some of these values (Wiredu 1996, 31). 
 
On the basis of the intelligibility of conceptual, epistemic and ethical universals, Wiredu argues 
for cultural universals. Construing culture as not just the social forms and customary beliefs and 
practices of a human group but also inclusive of the phenomenon of language, knowledge, 
communication and modes of transmitting values from one generation to the other, Wiredu 
asserts that the possession of one language or another by all human societies constitutes a 
cultural universal par excellence (Wiredu 1996, 30). As language is necessary for any human 
community, what the particular language consists in is a matter of contingency. Just as Wiredu 
insists that there are cultural universals, he also believes that philosophy can be universal, even 
though it is culture-relative in actuality (Wiredu 1980, 33). 
 
Some Comments on Wiredu’s Philosophical Account of Cultural Universals 
and Particulars 
Following the above exposition of the thrust of Wiredu’s position on cultural universals and 
particulars, it is pertinent at this juncture to critically appraise his submissions. We think Wiredu 




















should be commended for the systematic and logical way in which he presented his position. 
Wiredu’s attempt at providing an African perspective of the problem of cultural universals and 
particulars is a brilliant intellectual engagement. D.A. Masolo acknowledges this when he noted: 
Wiredu contributes and adds an African tone to the familiar and perhaps one of 
the most influential preoccupations of twentieth-century philosophy, viz., analytic 
theories on the relation between language, meaning, and mind. What he adds to 
the literature is the view that meaning cannot be understood in pure logical terms 
without the collective and relational social base that makes the very idea of 
meaning possible. Meanings and, by implication, mind, are objective in the sense 
that they are biologically made possible, and not in the sense that they exist as 
entities independently of the communicative act (Masolo 2005, par. 27). 
 
While we join Masolo in commending Wiredu for the freshness of his analysis, we think that the 
extent to which Wiredu succeeded in this quest is questionable, as there are inherent 
contradictions and flaws in his position. 
 
Cultural Universals and Particulars in the Philosophy of Kwasi Wiredu: Some Comments 31 
 
 
It does appear that Wiredu’s biological universalism is not sufficient to account for cultural 
universals. In an earlier work, “The Akan Concept of Mind”, Wiredu (1983, 121) noted that the 
universality of the one human family is based on the okra, which according to him is equal in all 
human beings at all time because it transcends the biological. Okra is a quasi-material part of 
man “whose presence in the body means life and whose absence means death and which also 
receives the individual’s destiny from God” (Wiredu 1995, 133). 
 
Elsewhere, Wiredu (1996, 34-41) based the biological universality of man on the standards of 
thought and actions in Homo sapiens, which include: reflective perception, abstraction, 
principles of non-contradiction and induction. Given these shifts in Wiredu’s philosophy, it is 
vital to note that unless he explicates the relations between these varying accounts, his analysis 
may after all be rocked with conceptual inconsistency. One foreseeable implication of such 
conceptual conflation is that we will have as many universals as we choose to have, as we can 
often identify certain resemblances among two or more cultures. And as many categories come 
into the scene as universals, the whole idea of universalism becomes implausible. One serious 
challenge that this may pose to any philosophical enterprise in metaphysics or epistemology is: 
upon what universal consideration can we assess supposed claims to universal categories, truth, 
reality or value? This is an issue worthy of further philosophical reflection. 
 
Wiredu in his recent writings attempts to explore conceptual decolonization as a means of 
asserting the full humanity of the African people. In this regard, he sees the demarcating 
elements in world civilization and culture on the basis of conceptual particularism. At the same 
time, he seeks to underscore what the Africans have in common with the rest of the world, with 
his emphasis on conceptual universals. Wiredu claims that his agenda for contemporary African 
philosophy - conceptual decolonization - has the potential of unmasking spurious universals, so 
that supposed conceptual contrasts such as those between physical and spiritual, substance and 
attribute, and a host of others may turn out not to be universal necessities of human thought. His 
works on conceptual decolonization using the Akan thought system as his basis are aimed at 
accounting for African self-identity. However, when one looks critically at Wiredu’s idea of 
conceptual decolonization, it leaves one in doubt as to whether it is designed to arrive at 
particulars. 





















Wiredu has written on “The Akan Concept of Mind” (1983), “The Concept of Truth in the Akan 
Language” (1985), “An Akan Perspective on Human Rights” (1990), “The African Concept of 
Personhood” (1992) amongst others. In all these works, Wiredu’s conclusions on the themes 
discussed are attempts towards particularism. While there is nothing in principle wrong with 
Wiredu’s exercises in conceptual decolonization as a means of justifying the particularity of the 
self-identity of the Africans, the issue at stake is that such philosophical exercises have barely 
promoted conceptual universalism. 
 
Furthermore, Wiredu’s confusion of Homo sapiens as universal biological identity and his 
interpretation of Homo sapiens as humans possessing mental capacities such as reflective 
perception, abstraction and inference are susceptible to objection. According to Masolo (2005), 
the basis of Wiredu’s notion of cultural universalism is panpsychologism. This is the view that 
the cognitive capacity and process(es) through which knowledge and other forms of 
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consciousness are generated, and which is the very basis of the idea of mind, are the same in all 
members of the human species (Masolo 2005, 23). However, we think there is a problem in 
Wiredu’s position, especially when we consider his claim that at birth, a child is not born with a 
mind (adwene), which is the capacity for thinking as well as the outcome of the ideational 
exercise of that capacity (Wiredu 1983, 120). 
 
The simple implication of this is that Wiredu’s conception of biological identity, which excludes 
the mind from the elements that make up a child (Wiredu 1983, 129), tends toward a kind of 
materialism. We may ask how a child comes to exercise “adwene of okra”. One answer given by 
Wiredu is that it emerges as a result of the development of language, communication and other 
agencies of socialization. Communication makes the minds (Wiredu 1996, 21-22). Nevertheless, 
although language and communication, which Wiredu identifies as cultural universals, can 
enhance the thinking capacity, power of conception and articulation of a human being, they are 
not necessarily sufficient requirements for being a person. The reason for this is connected to the 
fact that there is a difference between a human being (Homo sapiens) and a human person. Every 
human person is a human being, but not all human beings qualify as human persons. This is due 
to the fact that beyond the biological features that qualify one to be a human being, there are 
social, psychological, cultural and moral requirements for being a human person. Personhood is 
in degrees contingent on the extent of fulfillment in these given areas, while the biological 
constitution of humans is constant and therefore universal. 
 
Moreover, it is difficult to ignore how intercultural communication, which Wiredu emphasises in 
his support for cultural universals, will not be fatuous given the fact of the subtle concession he 
accords to the differences in the capacity of languages. Though he is quick at pointing out that:  
  As human beings of different cultures interact more and more and become more 
and more, familiar with each other’s languages and philosophies, with any 
fallacies of racial superiority dropped, one can expect that there will be increasing 
cross-appropriation, and consequently, cross- fertilization of ideas; so that cultural 
difference will become more and more unreliable as an index to philosophical 
difference (Wiredu 2002, 204). 
 
Being cautious on the issue of language, A.G.A. Bello (2004, 266) logically posits that while it 
may be true that no language is intrinsically superior or inferior to another one, it is safe to say 




















that some languages may be better than some others. This position entails some fundamental 
difficulties in Wiredu’s attempt to give his biologism a theoretical defense. It is incontrovertible 
that divergence exists among the peoples of the world. These lie in their conceptual scheme, 
language, culture and beliefs concerning most fundamental issues of life. The consequence of 
this on Wiredu’s view is that there are certain concepts that cannot be translated from one 
language into another. If this is permitted, it follows that universal concepts will contain within 
them certain untranslatable concepts. It is on this basis that Barry Hallen objects to Wiredu’s 
position, insisting that while the assumption of the universality of meaning that enables cross-
cultural linguistic interaction possesses obvious utility for a field linguist who is confronted with 
the need to translate an alien language, the resultant manual if translated cannot preclude an 
ethnocentric bias, since the translator “will likely favour the meaning of their own native 
language - English, for example, effectively universalizing them into propositions, and then 
proceed to impose English meanings upon other languages via the process of translation” (Hallen 
1995, 379).  




Hallen’s refutation of Wiredu’s conceptual universals seems plausible. He establishes that 
translation is often a problem in intercultural communication. Indeed, even in several of 
Wiredu’s works (1983; 2002 etc.), he has shown that there are certain concepts that are non-
translatable across cultures. Thus when we engage in the translation of such concepts from one 
language into another, we are challenged by inaccurate interpretation and translation. If this is 
granted, it follows that if we are to communicate with other societies, there will be an imposition 
of one cultural meaning on another; and by this, we may have what Wiredu refers to as a 
conceptual universal, yet in reality have no more than a disguised conceptual colonialism. 
 
The linguistic bias in the above arises from the fact that each national language is a unique 
human creation that has its own intricate conceptual network(s) - ontological, epistemological, 
aesthetic, etc. - with distinctive semantic predispositions (Hallen 1995, 379). From this putative 
conclusion of Hallen, we arrive at the threshold of cultural particularism/relativism. Hallen is 
making a valid point, because there is the possibility of untranslatability, and this will hamper the 
process of cross-cultural understanding. However, it is equally arguable as Gordon Hunnings 
(1975, 13) does that “un-translatability does not necessarily imply unintelligibility.” This is 
particularly so when we realize that there is no human language that cannot be learnt in principle 
by a non-native speaker as a second language. Wiredu is quite right, when in support of this, he 
observed that “a human being is a rule-following animal, and language is nothing but an 
arrangement of rules. Therefore, barring the impairment of faculties, any human being will 
necessarily have the capacity to understand and use a language… [and] any language” (Wiredu 
1996, 25). 
 
Contrary to Wiredu’s claim above, Bello gives an argument that dampens the case for objective 
criteria for cross-cultural translation: 
It is neither necessary nor important to classify problems, data, ideas, concepts or 
techniques as either universal or particular, especially since Wiredu himself 
concedes that the universality of a mode of conceptualization does not guarantee 
its objective validity…. Let us not limit our thoughts to ideas we reckon 
universals, for whatever reason(s), whether linguistic or indigent of language 
(Bello 2004, 267). 
 




















Yet Bello’s position above does not unearth the foundation of Wiredu’s argument for universals. 
Wiredu’s point is that humans as Homo sapiens share certain traits or qualities that enable them 
to communicate. Whether such qualities as identified by Wiredu are necessary, sufficient or 
exclusive conditions of humanness and universalism or not is a different question altogether. 
Apparently, humans cannot talk without making reference to one or many. For instance, in the 
Platonic worldview, the concept of beauty is a universal whilst we have individual men or 
women that participate in the universal. However, logicians often argue that we cannot talk about 
certain propositions without making reference to some, one or all. If this is true, then Bello’s 
position that it is neither necessary nor important to classify concepts as either universal or 
particular fails the logical test. 
 
We share Wiredu’s conviction that we can only access the world through our conceptual 
categories, either particularly or universally. Although Wiredu argues that the conceptualization 
of a universal does not guarantee its objective validity, it does not follow that its conceptual 
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objectification is invalid. What is required in this regard is substantial argument for its existence 
or validity. However, in contradiction to the position of Bello and in support of Wiredu, we do 
not accept that it cannot be established. To this end, whatsoever we wish to account for under the 
concept of universal must be radically demonstrated. The negative consequence of this view on 
Wiredu’s position is that it may lead us to put too many concepts into the class of universals. 
 
Keita’s objection to Wiredu’s position, which is to the effect that a cultural universal is nothing 
but a cultural particular, is worthy of explication. On the biological identity of human beings as 
Homo sapiens, Keita (1997, 171) argues that the human mental capacity for reflective 
perception, abstraction and inference, which for Wiredu are cultural universals, miss the mark 
since the mental does not satisfy the feature of being empirically ostensible, which is necessary 
for something to be cultural and universal: 
Wiredu is correct in arguing that there are cultural universals, but they are none 
other than the general forms of what we refer to as cultural particulars (Keita 
1997, 134). 
According to Keita, cultural universals are items and practices that are found in all cultures, 
thereby warranting a general term for them, despite their extensive variability. Examples are 
social organization, economic institutions, educational establishments, religious organizations, 
and legal institutions, marriage, among a host of others. These are found generally in all cultures; 
but they only have particular cultural colorations in respective cultures. 
 
It is reasonable to note that we can talk of cultural universals in terms of cultural particulars, 
while in actual fact they do not mean the same. There are certain characteristics that are common 
to particular kinds of things. It may be a name, concept or something that all things participate in. 
These are what we conceive as universals. Therefore Keita’s universals cannot be reduced to 
particulars or vice versa. But is Wiredu’s conception of universals necessarily and sufficiently 
distinct from particulars? Do universals, whether conceptual or epistemic, arise from particular 
concepts or particular notions of truth? Or can cultural universals emerge without making 
reference to particular cultures? 
 
We think that these questions pose a threat to the demarcation between universals and 
particulars. This may warrant the conclusion that universals are products of particular cultures. 




















One major implication of Wiredu’s notion of universals is that conceptual universals, which are 
the cornerstone of his position, will amount to the absolutization of some cultures’ conceptual 
particularism on other cultures. However, Keita’s argument that mental capacity does not satisfy 
the feature of empirical sensibility appears to limit the argument for cultural universals to mere 
observable data. For the sake of argument, we could account for empirical justification of 
cultural ingredients on language. For instance, before one can communicate, one requires a 
language, which itself depends on mental capability, without which we cease to be human 
beings. On this basis, we agree that mental capacity is universal in all cultures. This is a position 
which Keita rejects, but which Wiredu plausibly presents. 
 
Still on the critique of Wiredu, we have Godfrey Onah’s refutation. Wiredu (1996, 35) speaks of 
a continuum in human existence, which moves “from its biological base to all the spirals of 
potentialities.” However, Onah (2002) asks in what exactly these spirals consist if they are not 
biological. Wiredu seems to be aware of this difficulty, for he makes a remark which may appear 
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to offer a solutions to it: “There is the notion of an advance beyond the biological at the human 
level, (but) there is no suggestion of an ontological transcendence of the biological” (Wiredu 
1996, 36). However, Onah (2002, 69) questions further what this human level that advances 
beyond the biological is; and how this level can be said to advance beyond the biological without 
being ontologically transcendent of the biological. Inconsistently however, and despite his 
protestations, Wiredu (1995, 133) at least once, translates okra in Akan conceptual scheme as 
“soul”, and asserts that it ontologically transcends the biological. 
 
Odera Oruka criticizes Wiredu’s notion of morality, which he (Wiredu) defines in terms of 
sympathetic impartiality. Citing Rawls’ principle of rational egoism, Oruka argues that 
sympathetic impartiality may not in fact be necessary. Rational egoism alone, that is, calculating 
impartiality, is enough as a conception of morality. “In Rawls state of nature,” Oruka comments, 
“Individuals lack sympathetic impartiality and they do not even acquire it in a civil state 
otherwise there would be little need for police, prisons and class wars. They remain egoists and 
many of them are still rational, otherwise the society would have melted away” (Oruka 1990, 
27). 
 
From the broadest perspective, since morality accounts not only for the good but also for the bad, 
for us to have a universal moral doctrine it must take into cognizance the sympathetic 
impartiality as well as calculating impartiality. Both will account for what morality entails in the 
ordinary sense of the word. Thus Wiredu misrepresents the true nature of human beings in 
society. For people could be rational, irrational, egoistic, altruistic, selfish, loving etc. Thus 
morality attempts to unite human traits for the good of human society. But Wiredu has 
underestimated the encompassing nature of moral universals. 
 
Furthermore, Oruka (1990, 28) correctly suggests that Wiredu “did not shut the door to the 
admission of other cultural universals.” On this basis, Oruka added “intuition” to the catalogue of 
cultural universals on the ground that it is the most obvious of all cultural universals, but the least 
recognized and appreciated in philosophical inquiries. By intuition, he means a “form of mental 
skill which helps the mind to extrapolate from experience and come to establish extra statistical 
inductive truths … or to make a correct/ plausible logical inference without any established or 




















known rules of procedures” (Oruka 1990, 29). However, we do not see any reason why Oruka’s 
notion of intuition could be considered to be a universal on the basis of his definition. Indeed, 
going by Oruka’s assertion, children around the age of two and the mentally ill would be 
excluded from the category of human persons, since they are probably incapable of exercising 
intuition. This suggests that intuition is a particular rather than a universal. 
 
Like Wiredu, Oruka holds that there are cultural universals; but for him, there is also the reality 
of cultural fundamentals (“concepts, styles of language and a method of work or psychological 
expectation that helps to mark one culture from another”) that hamper smooth philosophical 
dialogues (Oruka 1990, 32, 36). To grant that cultural fundamentals are apt to impede 
philosophical dialogue, as Oruka claims, is not necessarily to foreclose the reality of cultural 
universals. Irrespective of the search for a distinctive African identity, we belong to the 
community of human beings. 
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Extending the Frontiers of Cultural Universals: A Case for Causality 
As Oruka has rightly noted, Wiredu has not shut the door to the admission of other possible 
cultural universals. This suggests that the realm of cultural universals is open – ended. On the 
basis of this, we seek to present a case for causality as another cultural universal that defies any 
cultural coloration. 
 
The idea of causality can be found in all cultures of the world, although it has different 
interpretations from culture to culture, yet it underlines our modes of thought. Just like 
abstraction, inference and communication, causality is part of the foundation of our thought. For 
instance, everybody acts today on the bases of what happened in the past, whether the recent or 
distant past. We believe that what happens in the past provides a ground for our understanding of 
the future. Without this inference, we may not be able to communicate our experience, and 
would thereby cease to be human beings. Consequently, it is plausible to hold that causality is 
the foundation of language and inference. If this is acceptable, it follows that without causality 
we cannot even appreciate conceptual or epistemic universals. We can infer from this that behind 
Wiredu’s biological traits is the idea of causality. 
 
The notion of causality is found in all cultures of the world. Though many African scholars have 
made a case for a notion of causality which is different from that of the West. Such attempts are 
seen in the traditionalist account of African causal explanation. Pertinent among the 
traditionalists who have made contributions on a unique African notion of causality are J.O. 
Sodipo (1973) and K.C. Anyanwu (1983). 
 
For Anyanwu, there can be no culturally neutral conception of causality. His argument 
presupposes that the idea of causality in Western science is deeply rooted in Western culture, and 
as a result cannot be a yardstick for judging the conception of causality in traditional African 
thought. Similarly, causality in traditional African thought is a product of the African culture, 
and therefore cannot be compared with causal principles of Western culture or any other culture 
for that matter; and by implication, every culture or thought system has its own unique 
conception of causality. What is considered as the cause of an event in any culture depends on 
that cultures conception of the structure of reality (Anyanwu 1983, 26). 





















In the case of Sodipo, he argues that causal principles in science are different from those of 
traditional Yoruba thought. For him, causal explanations in science are provided through the 
application of general laws and the observation of empirical facts. In other words, causal 
explanations in science are “impersonal”, as they are out to tackle the question “How?” In the 
traditional African thought on the other hand, there is an easy recourse to gods in the people’s 
causal explanation, which makes the question “how?” yield too soon to the question “why?” As 
such, the principle of causal explanation, Sodipo tells us, simply becomes personal. He therefore 
concludes that “the causal principles of science are fundamentally different from those of the 
traditional Yoruba because while the goal of causal explanation in science is designed to satisfy 
cognitive ends, in traditional Yoruba thought it is adopted to satisfy emotional and aesthetic 
needs” (Sodipo 1973, 14). 
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We can therefore see that the fact of difference in Western and African causal explanations 
implies for both Sodipo and Anyanwu a difference in their notion of causality. However, such 
temptation must be rationally resisted because if Africans were to have a unique notion of 
causality, then the traditionalists should have given an African analysis of the phrase ‘A’ causes 
‘B’, which is the cornerstone meaning of causality. Apparently, none of the traditionalists 
attempted this. Instead, they attempted to answer the question of what things the Africans regard 
as causes. Sodipo (1973, 22) for instance, said “entities such as Olodumare, divinities, spirits, 
magic, witchcraft, ori (destiny), etc. feature prominently in Yoruba causal explanation.” 
Anyanwu’s (1983, 63) answer is that causes of events in Africa are based on the structure of 
African reality, which he argues, centers on hierarchy of force. God is on the crown of hierarchy 
of force, followed by the divinities, ancestors, spirits, man, animals, plants and minerals. 
 
To our mind, these answers do not imply that Africans have a notion of causality 
characteristically different from that of the West. Such traditionalists’ attempt to portray Africans 
as having such is aptly described by Balogun (2004, 2) as “a reaction and reflection bid to bail 
Africans out of colonial subjugation and battered identity.” In Balogun’s recent view (2010), 
with which we concur, “the cultural particularistic attempts by traditionalists to defend a unique 
African causal explanation only mean that the West focuses more on event causation (material, 
scientific and general notion of causal explanation) and Africans more on agent causation 
(metaphysical and personalized notions of causal explanation).” Both event causation and agent 
causation are different kinds of causal explanation but do not necessarily imply different notions 
of causality. 
 
Causality is a universal notion. If Africans had a notion of causality different from that of the 
West, what they would mean by the phrase ‘A’ causes ‘B’ would be evidently different from 
what Westerners mean by it. Like that of the West, the African understanding of causality entails 
temporal precedence, necessary connection, transitivity, and necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Hence causality is a universal, which further strengthens the compatibility of cultural 
particularities and cultural universals. 
 





















We have examined Wiredu’s perspective on the problem of supposed incompatibility of cultural 
universals with cultural particulars. We have examined Wiredu’s view that the human species is 
universally bonded in biological identity, norms of thought and communication. For Wiredu, 
universals, correctly conceived in the light of our common biological identity, are not 
incompatible with cultural particularities, and in fact, are what make intercultural communication 
possible. Contrary to popular speculations that such things as history, culture or ideology unify 
humans, Wiredu’s argument is to the effect that these features are the causes of diversity rather 
than the unification of humans. Wiredu therefore maintains that our biological constitution is the 
core basis of our commonality and language is the fulcrum of the idea of cultural universals. This 
paper has attempted a critical assessment of these assertions and others of Wiredu’s assumptions. 
 
Furthermore, we have attempted to explore the plausibility of causality as an example of a 
cultural universal. While the existential reality of culture shows that particulars can neither be 
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undermined nor ignored as unintelligible, “the different cultural worlds,” we agree with Otakpor 
(1999, 18), “can benefit each other by respecting and accommodating that which is not common 
property: the varieties of art forms, philosophies, religions, literatures, histories, and ways of 
life.” The level of success achievable in this regard is contingent, to a great extent, on the reality 
or myth of a universal language and trans-cultural communication. 
 
In the light of the foregoing reflections, we conclude that while Kwasi Wiredu’s contribution to 
the discourse on universalism and particularism is philosophically illuminating and provoking, it 
makes some debatable assertions which call for further inquiry. 
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